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ABSTRACT 
According to Crispin Wright, we have evidential justification for, or knowledge 
of, various propositions that we quotidianly accept only if we have antecedent 
justification for accepting general hinge propositions––called ‘cornerstones’––
which cannot be evidentially supported. Wright contends that this doesn’t 
engender scepticism, for we are non-evidentially entitled to accept cornerstones. 
This paper focuses on the Leaching Worry––the concern that since the epistemic 
risky of accepting a cornerstone C without evidence for it is significantly high, the 
epistemic risky of accepting a proposition P for which C is a cornerstone is also 
significantly high, to the effect that one cannot have evidential justification for, or 
knowledge that, P. We suggest that Wright’s original response to the Leaching 
Worry retains its strength if risk is construed in accordance with the non-orthodox 
(non-probabilistic) notions of risk recently introduced by Duncan Pritchard 
(modal notion) and Philip Ebert, Martin Smith and Ian Durbach (normic notion). 
We concede, however, that Luca Moretti’s recent probabilistic version of the 
Leaching Worry isn’t undercut by Wright's original response. We put forward two 
novel responses: revising the notion of significant epistemic risk originally 
adopted by Wright, or broadening the range of attitudes towards cornerstones that 




One type of argument to sceptical paradox proceeds by making a case that a certain kind of 
metaphysically “heavyweight”(Dretske, 2005, Hawthorne 2005) or “cornerstone” (Wright 
2004) proposition is beyond all possible evidence and hence may not be known or justifiably 
believed. Examples of such propositions include that there is an external material world at all, 
that there are any other minds besides one’s own, that the world is replete with general 
lawlike patterns that are reliably reflected in local samples, and that the world did not come 
into being twenty minutes ago brimming with apparent traces (including apparent memories) 
of a much more substantial history. If such propositions are false, then sense experience is no 
guide to material reality, behaviour and physical condition is no guide to others’ mental 
states, generalisations inductively suggested by local samples are unreliable and most 
apparent evidence for the past has no probative force 
 The details of such sceptical arguments show some variety, but they do not matter for 
present purposes.1 We are concerned here rather with a general strategy of response to them 
which argues that, even were the point admitted that the heavyweights and cornerstones are 
indeed beyond all evidence and knowledge, it would not follow that we thereby forfeit all 
claim to know, or at least justifiably to believe, the vast legion of specific propositions about 
the material world, others’ minds, scientific law and the past, that we are accustomed to think 
 
1 For one potentially important distinction, between what are there dubbed respectively “Humean” and 
“Cartesian” forms of sceptical paradox, see Wright (2004). 
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that we can and do know, or at least justifiably believe. This strategy, defended by Wright,2 
pivots on a notion of epistemic entitlement, in accordance with which one may be rationally 
fully warranted in trusting in the truth of certain propositions even though they lie beyond the 
range of possible knowledge or evidence. The basic idea is then that, with rational trust in 
such entitlements in place, a subject can justifiably proceed to attach the evidential 
significance to the deliverances of their senses, other’s behaviour and physical condition, 
local patterns in samples, and their apparent memories and other presumed evidential traces 
of the past, that they customarily do. So if the sceptical challenge is to demonstrate how it can 
be rational to take ourselves to know or anyway to have ample evidential justification for the 
ordinary quotidian empirical beliefs that we routinely incessantly form, the answer is that, 
once it is acknowledged that it is fully rational trustingly to accept the cornerstones for a 
domain of enquiry, there is no straightforward passage from the thesis that we have no 
evidence for them to the conclusion that we thereby forfeit any positive epistemic standing 
for our beliefs throughout the domain in question. Rather, if we are rationally entitled to trust 
that there is an external material world, e.g, then there is no obstacle to the thought that, at 
least as far as that particular question is concerned, our ordinary perceptual faculties are 
reliably delivering veridical information about it.  
 Again, our present concern is not with the case for thinking that we do indeed possess 
such epistemic entitlements, but with a train of thought that argues that they cannot actually 
do the counter-sceptical epistemic work just adumbrated. That is the gist of the Leaching 
Worry. 
2. The Leaching Worry  
Wright (2004) characterised the worry thus: 
 
The general picture is that the cornerstones which sceptical doubt assails are to be held in place 
as things one may warrantedly trust without evidence. Thus at the foundation of all our cognitive 
procedures lie things we merely implicitly trust and take for granted, even though their being 
entitlements ensures that it is not irrational to do so. But in that case, what prevents this ‘merely 
taken for granted’ character from leaching upwards from the foundations, as it were like rising 
damp, to contaminate the products of genuine cognitive investigation? If a cognitively earned 
warrant—say my visual warrant for thinking that there is a human hand in front of my face right 
now—is achieved subject to a mere entitled acceptance that there is a material world at all, then 
why am I not likewise merely entitled to accept that there is a hand in front of my face, rather 
than knowing or fully justifiably believing that there is? 3 
 
One natural way to elaborate this doubt is in terms of a notion of significant epistemic risk, 
whereby one is at significant epistemic risk in accepting P just if one lacks both knowledge 
of P and a balance of evidence in favour of believing P. Conversely if one knows P or one’s 
evidence on balance favours believing P, then doing so involves, in this specific sense, no 
significant epistemic risk. Let C be the cornerstone proposition that there is an external 
material world and P some specific material world proposition which one would normally 
regard as known or at least as comfortably justified on the basis of one’s current perceptual 
experience. P will entail C and, although rationally entitled to do so, we have, according to 
the sceptical paradox, absolutely no evidence for C and are therefore at significant epistemic 
risk, as defined above, in trusting in its truth. But were C not true, neither would P be. So 
how can we not be at significant epistemic risk in accepting P? And how can that admission 
be consistent with our having knowledge of, or a balance of evidence in favour of P? 
 
2 In addition to his (2004) see also Wright (2012) and (2014). 
3 Wright (2004), p. 207. 
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 As Sebastiano Moruzzi has observed,4 we can develop this Leaching worry in terms 
of the putative inconsistency of the three propositions, (1), (2) and (4), below: 
(1)  If we run a significant risk in accepting C, then we run a significant risk in accepting P 
 (1) may seem merely to articulate an immediate implication of C's being
 unevidenced and a logical consequence of P. 
(2)  We do run a significant risk in accepting C 
 This is entailed by the definition of “significant epistemic risk”. After all, entitled  to 
 accept C though we may be, the dialectical context is one where it has been conceded 
 to the sceptic that we have no evidence for C. 
Hence 
(3) We do run a significant epistemic risk in accepting P 
Yet if the idea that we are rationally entitled to trust in C is to do any interesting counter-
sceptical work, it must somehow put us in position to claim that 
(4)  We know P. 
And surely the propositions (4), that P is known, and (3), that we run a significant epistemic 
risk in accepting it, should be regarded as non-cotenable. 
Wright (2004) concurred and responded that, since (2) is acknowledged on all hands, — and 
if deployment of the notion of entitlement is indeed to be of any counter-sceptical use, — we 
need to reject (1). But that, it was there contended, is exactly what we should do in any case, 
since it may be that despite our running a significant risk in accepting it, C is in fact true. In 
that case there may be no significant epistemic risk in accepting P since P can then be a 
deliverance of reliably functioning perceptual faculties in an external material world that is 
receptive to them and much as we take it to be, with the result, so we may take it, that P is 
thereby known.  
 What, Wright (2004) conceded, is at risk as a consequence of the riskiness of 
accepting C is rather the higher-order claim that (4) itself is known, more specifically, that we 
can knowledgeably lay claim to know P. Rather, the position is, in effect, that while in 
general the overall conditions sufficient to enable the acquisition of perceptual knowledge 
may obtain, we have only an entitlement to suppose so. That is not inconsistent with (4) — 
with our actually possessing such knowledge of P. But it is inconsistent with our knowing or 
having a balance of evidence, as opposed to being entitled to suppose, that we do. All the 
same, with that conceded, we can still be rationally entitled to claim that that is indeed our 
fortunate situation.  
 In summary: Wright (2004) conceded that there is indeed ‘leaching’ of entitlement 
upwards from cornerstones but contended that what is thereby displaced is not — better: may 
not justifiably be affirmed to be — our knowledge of, or perceptual justification for accepting 
P, but the second-order epistemic credentials of such propositions, which ought consequently 
to be re-characterised as matters of entitlement. 
 And with that response Wright (2004) was content to leave the matter.5 
3. Varieties of (Epistemic) Risk 
We need a caveat before proceeding to review the stability of this response. The term ‘risk’, 
as it occurs in contexts of advice, admonition, or prudential reasoning is customarily taken to 
connote the probability of an unwanted event or situation, where this probability is estimated 
 
4 In an Arché seminar discussion in the early 2000s. 
5 For critical discussion of Wright’s response independent of the argument to follow, see McGlynn (2017). 
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on a relevant body of evidence. Thus, the degree of risk associated with a proposition Q 
describing an unwanted event or situation is customarily thought of simply as Q’s degree of 
evidential probability (cf. Hansson 2018 and Ebert et. al. 2019). This usage is, for instance, 
exemplified by the statement that, on the current medical evidence, the risk that a smoker’s 
life is shortened by some smoking-related disease is about ½ (cf. Hansson 2018).6 Sometimes 
people speak of the risk that one runs in accepting a proposition, P, as true, or acting on the 
assumption that P is true. In this case the unwanted situation is one in which P is actually 
false. So, the risk that one runs in accepting or acting on the assumption of P is actually the 
risk associated with P’s being false. 
However, it is by no means self-evident that our intuitive judgements about risk in 
general track — or ought to track — probability. The recent literature7 has supported the 
credentials of two interestingly non-probabilistic notions of risk. Duncan Pritchard has 
argued that in a wide class of cases, the risk one runs in accepting, or acting on the 
assumption of a certain proposition, P, is best assessed not in terms of P’s probability — 
whereby the smaller the probability, the higher the risk of acceptance — but in modal terms: 
roughly by how safe the assumption of P is — that is, by how similar to the actual world are 
the nearest worlds in which P fails: the more similar these worlds to actuality, the higher the 
risk of accepting P. Thus, on this view, the risk of accepting P is higher than the risk of 
accepting Q just in case the worlds most similar to actuality in which P is untrue are more 
similar to actuality than the worlds most similar to actuality in which Q is untrue. 
Pritchard attempts to motivate his proposal by appeal to a scenario in which our 
intuitions of degree of risk are supposed to align inversely with the extent of the departure it 
involves from actuality rather than with chance. In our view there are serious problems with 
the details of the example.8 However we are sympathetic with the general suggestion that our 
estimate of the degree of risk involved in an assumption often has more to do with the 
perceived extravagance of the nearest possible scenarios in which it fails than with any 
estimate, however rough, we feel able to make of the numerical probability of its obtaining.  
 
6 A refinement of this conception, adopted in professional risk management and economics, interprets ‘risk’ as 
referring to the expectation value of a possible negative event, which is the product of the event’s probability 
and some measure of its severity (cf. Hansson 2018). To avoid sterile complications, we set aside this more 
technical notion. 
7 See Pritchard (2015, 2016) and Ebert et al. (2020). 
8 Here is (an edited version of) Pritchard’s (2015 and 2016) principal example: 
 Bomb 1: An evil scientist has rigged up a bomb hidden in a populated area. There is no way of 
discovering the bomb. It will detonate only if a certain set of numbers comes up on the next national lottery 
draw. The odds of these numbers appearing is fourteen million to one. It is impossible to interfere with this 
lottery draw. 
 Bomb 2: An evil scientist has rigged up a bomb hidden in a populated area. There is no way of 
discovering the bomb. It will detonate only if three highly unlikely events all obtain. First, the weakest horse in 
the field at the Grand National, Lucky Loser, wins the race by at least ten furlongs. Second, the worst team 
remaining in the FA Cup draw, Accrington Stanley, beats the best team remaining, Manchester United, by at 
least ten goals. Third, the Queen of England spontaneously chooses to speak a complete sentence of Polish 
during her next public speech. The odds of this chain of events occurring are fourteen million to one. It is 
impossible to interfere with the outcomes of any event in this chain. 
 Let P state that the bomb will detonate. Pritchard asserts that although P is equally likely in both cases, 
the assumption that P is false — that the bomb will not detonate — is intuitively appreciably riskier in Bomb 1 
than in Bomb 2. Pritchard explains this intuition by suggesting that P appears safer in Bomb 1 than Bomb 2. But 
it is unclear to us that this explanation is correct. It is a mere stipulation by Pritchard that the event that would 
trigger the detonation in Bomb 1 can actually meaningfully be said to have the same degree of chance as the 
sequence of events that would trigger the detonation in Bomb 2. It is consequently quite unwarranted to assume 
that any sense of diminished riskiness of P’s being true that folk do indeed have in contemplating Bomb 2 is 
sensitive to this merely stipulated, possibly meaningless, equality.  
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Pritchard’s modal (safety) proposal contrasts with a third — the so-called “Normic” 
account of risk, canvassed by Ebert, Smith and Durbach (2020). According to this account, 
the risk of a proposition P is determined by the degree of normality of the most normal 
worlds in which P is true. The more normal these worlds are –– that is to say, the closer they 
are to the maximally normal worlds –– the higher the risk of P. On this view, the risk of P is 
higher than the risk of Q just in case the most normal worlds in which P is true are more 
normal than the most normal worlds in which Q is true.  
Three points should be noticed: first, on the normic account, the maximally normal 
worlds need not include the actual world. As Ebert, Smith and Durbach  stress, “truth doesn’t 
entail normalcy and there is nothing contradictory in saying ‘P is true but P wouldn’t 
normally be true.’”9 Second, the normality of a world w is understood as determined by the 
extent to which the respects in which w differed from the maximally normal worlds would 
call for special explanation, were w to obtain. (Thus for example, while the probability of 
Martin’s ticket winning the EuroMillions Jackpot lottery might be vanishingly small, it would 
call for no special explanation — no significant departure from normality — were it to do so. 
Somebody has to win).10 Third, the ordering of worlds by degree of normality is to be 
understood as restricted to worlds in which our actual background evidence holds, and should 
exclude worlds which are inconsistent with this background evidence. 
Ebert, Smith and Durbach offer no intuitive example in which the normic account 
diverges from the other two accounts and seems intuitively superior. But we will forbear 
from attempting to add here to the debates about these conflicting proposals. Indeed, there is 
a recent tendency to some agreement in the literature that our pre-theoretic judgements about 
risk do not provide a basis for identifying any one thing as deserving to be regarded as the 
correct notion of risk.11 Rather, our understanding of risk seems to be ‘open textured’ to a 
degree, admitting of more than one explication or precisification, so that a form of pluralism 
about risk may be the right way to think about the notion.  
What is striking for the immediate purpose, however, is that neither the modal nor the 
normic accounts of risk promise to be of any service to an attempt at consolidation of the 
Leaching worry. The point is especially clear on the modal account. For suppose that there 
actually is indeed an external material world, that is very much as we judge it to be on the 
basis of ordinary perception. Then the nearest worlds in which there is no such material 
reality are massively dissimilar to the actual world. Accordingly, by the modal account, we 
run no significant risk in presuming the relevant cornerstone proposition to be true. Hence to 
presume, with the sceptic, that there is justification for thinking there is such a significant risk 
is, on the modal account, implicitly to suppose there is justification for an assumption 
 
9 Ebert, Smith and Durbach (2020), p. 444. 
10 The reader may well feel that this is not a great result for the normic view, since — worlds in which Martin’s 
ticket wins being roughly no less normal than worlds in which it doesn’t, — it seems we’d have to regard the 
alternatives, Win or Lose, as equally risky on the normic account. Of course it is odd to describe a good 
outcome as a ‘risk’ at all; but we could easily concoct an example where winning is a bad result. As Matt Jope 
has reminded us, a somewhat macabre but vivid example where normic considerations arguably provide a better 
recovery of our intuitions about risk than probabilistic ones can be provided by an embellishment of Shirley 
Jackson’s short story The Lottery - (The New Yorker, June 26 1948) - wherein a rural community runs a large 
lottery each year in the belief that full participation alone will serve to ward off a poor harvest and consequent 
famine in the following year. The sting is that in order to appease the agrarian Gods, the ‘winner’ must be put to 
death. The sense of risk had by the participants in such a setting would, plausibly, be much stronger than can be 
explained by the numerical probabilities alone. So much would be predicted by the normic account since for 
each participant, however statistically improbable it may be, ‘winning’ would be a wholly normal occurrence — 
someone has to ‘win’ — and thus would constitute a significant risk. 
11 Cf. Bricker (2018), Moretti (2019) and Ebert, Smith and Durbach (2020). 
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inconsistent with the truth of the cornerstone proposition—and hence to suppose that we are 
justified in denying that there is an external material world. Which of course we are not. 
The situation on the normic account is a little more complex. On the normic account, 
in order for an acceptance of the material world cornerstone to emerge as significantly risky, 
it has to be the case that there are worlds that include our actual ordinary background 
evidence, which are pretty normal and in which the cornerstone fails. Ask first: what would 
that require of “ordinary background evidence”? If it includes, as externalists will want to 
say, perceptual knowledge of our immediate material environment, then obviously there 
won’t be any normal worlds including that background evidence in which the cornerstone 
fails. So in order for our “ordinary background evidence” to be understood as consistent with 
failure of the cornerstone, an argument for thinking that acceptance of the cornerstone is risky 
on the normic conception will have to work with an internalist, “highest common factor” 
conception of “ordinary background evidence”. 
Well and good, it may be thought. Isn’t that in any case the conception of evidence to 
which one who, like Wright, concedes that the sceptical paradoxes have shown that the 
cornerstones are beyond evidence, is committed? To be sure. But now there are problems in 
explaining how acceptance of the cornerstones is risky by the lights of the normic conception. 
In fact there are two separate problems. The first is that our conception of what counts as 
abnormality, and thus as calling for special explanation, is constrained by a conception of the 
natural order of things which presupposes the usual cornerstones. Events and states of affairs 
are determined to be normal or abnormal relative to what is expectable, or anyway 
unremarkable, within explanatory frameworks for which the cornerstones serve as just that, 
and the explanations which abnormal occurrences call for are accordingly explanations in 
which the cornerstones are taken for granted. It follows that both the cornerstones and their 
sceptical negations are beyond the scope of kind of explanation which, on the normic 
account, abnormality constitutively demands—the cornerstones because they are presupposed 
in the relevant explanatory frameworks, and their sceptical negations because they are 
inconsistent with those frameworks. The normic conception of risk is thus essentially 
inapplicable to both. 
But there is a second, more intuitive point. Again, in order for it to rank as risky to 
accept a cornerstone C on the normic conception of risk, we have to make sense of the idea 
that C can fail in relatively normal worlds in which we have our actual (internal) evidence. 
And that requires that were C to fail, then that would call for no special explanation. But that 
seems intuitively preposterous. Surely, if the course of our actual experience were to have 
been what it has been and were to continue as, broadly, it always has and yet there were no 
external material reality, that would demand a Whale of an Explanation! If God speaks to you 
in a dream and advises you that such is the situation, saying nothing further, your reaction 
will not be, “Oh well. That was always on the cards” in the spirit of “Someone has to win”. 
We may conclude that if there is a development of the Leaching worry that does 
successfully exploit a notion of risk so as to do significant damage to the Wright (2004) 
entitlement proposal, it must work with a probabilistic conception of risk. Which brings us to 
the principal focus of this paper. 
§4 The Leaching worry revived? 
Moretti (2020) gives a detailed argument that, notwithstanding Wright’s original response, 
the Leaching worry can indeed be vindicated by orthodox probabilistic reasoning. In 
particular he argues that, once the pre-theoretical notion of significant epistemic risk is 
construed probabilistically and the Entitlement theorist allows that we are at significant 
epistemic risk in accepting cornerstones, significant epistemic risk must be acknowledged to 
transfer from acceptance of the cornerstones back to acceptance of the various relevant kinds 
of quotidian propositions about the external world, others’ mental states, and the past that we 
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take ourselves habitually and continually to come to know — and, to stress, that the degree of 
risk transferred is sufficient to undermine both that knowledge and the idea that we are 
evidentially justified in accepting such quotidian propositions  
 Here is the argument. Let Pr be a probability function interpreted subjectively. Pr(Q) 
is to express one’s degree of rational confidence that Q. Pr(Q|R), likewise, is to express one’s 
degree of rational confidence that Q conditional on one’s learning R. Consider again an 
empirically testable proposition P — say that there is a hand in front of your face —and a 
correlated sceptical alternative SH — say that there is no external material world but that a 
Mischievous Demon, who controls all your experiences and persistently maintains the 
illusion of an external world, is causing it to appear to you that there is a hand in front of your  
face. Note that we have chosen SH to be incompatible with P but specific enough to entail 
that you have a deceptive experience as of P’s being the case.12 Let E be the proposition that 
you have an experience as of P’s being true.  
 So: we have that P entails ¬SH, and SH entails E. Roger White (2006) has shown that 
provided those conditions are met, and if (1) and (2) following are accepted: 
 (1) Pr(SH) > 0, (which seems entirely reasonable, since the sceptical scenario is 
surely not certainly false); 
 (2) Pr(E) < 1, (which again seems entirely reasonable as a prior probability, since E 
describes a future contingency), 
then the probability that P is true, given that the experience depicted in E does indeed duly 
occur, is strictly less than the probability that the sceptical scenario depicted by SH does not 
obtain; that is, that 
 (*) Pr(P|E) < Pr(¬SH)13  
(which again, on reflection, seems entirely reasonable since among possible scenarios in 
which the E-predicting sceptical hypothesis is false, — because for instance there is indeed 
 
12 We emphasise to the reader that this feature is essential to the argument. The reasoning to follow requires the 
assumption that we are working with a sceptical hypothesis, SH, that predicts your actual evidence for P, or at 
least a fully convincing simulacrum of it. Suppose, for example, that P is ‘There is a hand in front of my face’, 
asserted on the basis of current perceptual experience, that E reports such an experience and that  ¬SH is simply 
‘There is a material world’. In this case P entails ¬SH, but SH –– i.e. ‘There is no material world’ –– doesn’t 
entail E –– that is, that I undergo an experience as if there is a hand in front of my face. In such a case the 
following proof doesn’t apply, and the revamped Leaching worry about to be developed will be pre-empted. 
13 Here is White’s proof:— 
Since Pr(SH) > 0 and SH entails E, Pr(E|SH) = 1. From this, since Pr(E) < 1, Pr(E|SH) > Pr(E). Thus, 
Pr(SH|E) > Pr(SH). Thus,  
(i) Pr(¬SH|E) < Pr(¬SH).  
Since Pr(SH) > 0 and SH entails E, then Pr(E) > 0. From this, given that P entails ¬SH, it follows that 
(ii) Pr(P|E) ≤ Pr(¬SH|E). 
From (i) and (ii), by transitivity, Pr(P|E) < Pr(¬SH). QED. 
White originally presented this nice observation as a problem for Jim Pryor’s (2000) perceptual dogmatism — 
for the idea that the evidential force of ordinary perceptual experience is, as a default, presuppositionless. There 
is an irony, therefore, in the fact that the very same theorem may be deployed against the attempt, via the notion 
of Entitlement, to shore up the opposed perceptual conservatism, whose signature claim is to grant the sceptic 
the presuppositional role of cornerstones, against the sceptical paradoxes (as in Wright 2004 and 2014). 
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an external material world — there will be instances where P is false even though the 
experience depicted by E occurs.) 
 Proposition (*) says that if S has an experience of the kind depicted by E, S’s degree 
of confidence on that basis in P, if rational, must remain strictly smaller than S’s prior 
confidence in ¬SH. Thus, S’s learning that E is true can make S rationally confident of P’s 
truth only if S is antecedently more confident of ¬SH’s truth, i.e, that the sceptical scenario is 
false. 
Well then, let’s now suppose specifically that Pr is a function purely of evidential 
probability.14 The degree of epistemic risk involved in the assumption that you are in the 
‘good case’ — i.e. that SH is false — can be identified with Pr(SH). And the degree of 
epistemic risk that P is false, given E, can be identified with Pr(¬P|E). It is straightforward 
to show that White’s result above 
(*)   Pr(P|E) < Pr(¬SH)  
is equivalent to: 
 (Quasi-leaching)   Pr(¬P|E) > Pr(SH).15 
(Quasi-leaching)16 states that, on assumptions (1) and (2) above, the probability that P is 
false given E — so the degree of evidential risk one runs in accepting P, given E — is strictly 
higher than the probability that the sceptical hypothesis is true. So you undertake a greater 
risk in accepting P on the basis of the experience depicted by E than you undertake in 
rejecting the sceptical hypothesis. You are more likely to be mistaken in thinking you have a 
hand on the basis of your current visual and kinaesthetic experience as of a hand than you are 
in discounting the Mischievous Demon scenario! 
 More explicitly: let r be an evidential threshold of significant epistemic risk, that is, 
for any proposition Q and evidence E, if Pr(Q/E) > r, the risk that Q is false for a subject, S, 
whose only germane evidence is E is so high that S’s accepting that proposition would be 
evidentially unjustified. Then (Quasi-leaching) entails that if Pr(SH) > r, then Pr(¬P|E) > r. 
That is to say, if S’s accepting ¬SH on the basis of a non-evidential entitlement –– and so 
prior to learning E –– is evidentially unjustifiably risky, S’s accepting P upon acquisition of 
the evidence E is also evidentially unjustifiably risky. 
 It is a matter for judgement whether this result directly contradicts Wright’s response 
to the original leaching worry or whether it merely drains away its purported significance. 
Wright’s response was that while your evidential deficiency in relation to the material world 
cornerstone should be acknowledged, you still retain a rational entitlement to accept it, and 
within the epistemic framework provided by that acceptance, are therefore entitled to regard 
your experience as powerfully evidential, indeed as knowledge-conferring, for P. If there is a 
risk in accepting that SH is false, that risk, the suggestion was, properly transmits not to the 
 
14 Note that evidential probability need not be represented as a conditional probability. The relevant evidence 
can be thought of as implicit in the unconditional probability function.  
15 This is so because Pr(P|E) = 1- Pr(¬P|E) and Pr(¬SH) = 1 - Pr(SH). 
16 We are speaking of  “Quasi-leaching” because although this thesis arguably does not directly imply that the 
risk of accepting P on the basis of E is an inheritance of the risk of accepting that the sceptical hypothesis is 
false (which was part of the original metaphor of “leaching upwards”), the apparent awkwardness of the result 
for the Entitlement theorist — the challenge to the rational coherence of the more favourable epistemic attitude 
to P than to SH to which the theorist aspires — is not diminished on that account. 
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acceptance of P itself but only to the second-order claim that one knows P on the basis of 
one’s experience — in effect, to the claim that one’s experience of E is a source of 
knowledge. Moreover that risky claim can still be one to which one is rationally entitled.  
However the sting in (Quasi-leaching) is that it is, seemingly, the acceptance of P itself on 
the basis of E and not merely the second-order claim to know it, that is disclosed as 
evidentially dangerous. Knowing P is not consistent with undertaking a significant epistemic 
risk in accepting P. So even if one enjoys nevertheless a rational entitlement to claim to know 
P on the basis of E, the result established in (Quasi-leaching) has not gone away that to act 
on that alleged entitlement — that is, actually to accept P — is yet more epistemically risky 
than to accept the cornerstone, the riskiness of which was acknowledged by the Entitlement 
proposal from the start. That proposal, it appears, must therefore contrive some way of 
blocking White’s result.  
§5 Three responses 
We shall canvass three possible responses on behalf of the Entitlement theorist, the first of 
which we will argue is beside the point, while the second and third may offer better prospects 
for stabilising Wright’s proposal. 
 (i) First, it might be suggested that since there is absolutely no evidence in support of 
the kind of sceptical hypotheses we are concerned with, their evidential probability ought 
actually to be reckoned to be very low, so that our trust in their negations should not be 
considered to be epistemically risky in the first place. In that case, the leaching worry is 
misconceived from the get-go: there is no significant epistemic risk that we run by accepting 
cornerstones and that might leach upwards to our routine acceptance of quotidian 
propositions that entail them. 
 Indeed, it might seem that there is a standpoint from which this response is fully 
justified. Reflect that if Pr(SH) were very low, then since Pr(SH) + Pr(¬SH) = 1, Pr(¬SH) 
should be extremely high. It follows that one who offers this first response is committed to 
holding that we have an overwhelming justification for accepting the negation of SH — an 
overwhelming justification for holding that there is an external material world, that other 
minds are real, etc. How might that claim be backed up? Well, isn’t that exactly the position 
of the kind of Moorean liberalism defended by Pryor and others? 17,18  
 
17 Pryor (2000).  
18 It is, by the way, worth noting that the Leaching worry as developed in the preceding section is unmitigated if  
we consider the epistemic predicament in which we are left by cogent sceptical argument to be one where we 
lack evidence both for a cornerstone and a sceptical hypothesis inconsistent with it, so that our epistemic 
predicament appears to be such that both Pr(SH) and Pr(¬SH) are largely undetermined by our evidence. We 
can straightforwardly refashion the notion of significant epistemic risk to include situations of lack of evidence. 
Let’s stipulate that S’s accepting Q is significantly epistemically risky if the probability of ¬Q is undetermined 
by S’s evidence within a wide interval of values the least upper bound of which exceeds r (where r, as above, is 
a threshold that, if exceeded, prevents S from justifiably believing Q). On this interpretation of significant 
epistemic risk, saying that S’s accepting ¬SH is epistemically risky is saying, not that Pr(SH) exceeds r but, 
rather, that Pr(SH) is indeterminate within a wide interval whose least upper bound exceeds r. Since S lacks 
evidence in favour or against ¬SH, it looks very plausible that S’s accepting ¬SH is epistemically risky in this 
redefined sense. Mofreover, it is easy to see that the epistemic risk of ¬SH continues to infect the acceptance of 
P even when it is characterised in this way. Since Pr(SH) is indeterminate within an interval whose least upper 
bound exceeds r, Quasi-leaching entails that Pr(¬P|E) must also be indeterminate within an interval whose 
least upper bound exceeds r. As before, once S’s accepting ¬SH on the basis of a non-evidential entitlement is 
allowed to be epistemically risky, S’s accepting P upon learning E must also be no less — indeed more —
epistemically risky. 
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 Such is indeed the Moorean liberal position, but invoking it here is doubly irrelevant. 
First, our concern is with the stability of the kind of response to scepticism proposed in the 
opposed conservative spirit that already concedes that the sceptical arguments do indeed 
make a case that the cornerstones are beyond evidence. But second, there is anyway an 
implicit misunderstanding of White’s result. That result is that the probability one attributes 
to P, given E, is constrained to be lower than the prior probability one assigns to the negation 
of SH. Thus even if, as Moorean liberalism supposes, the cornerstones have accumulated 
overwhelming evidential support from centuries of humankind’s quotidian experience, that 
says nothing about the probability they should be reckoned to have in advance of any 
particular experience. But it is that probability which an entitlement theorist who grants that 
the acceptance of cornerstones is irremediably significantly risky, thereby arguably concedes 
to be significantly below 1, thereby conceding the first premise of White’s reasoning,  
(1) Pr(SH) > 0. 
 (ii) The second response to the revamped Leaching worry pursues one way in which 
White’s first premise may be challenged. (The third response will consider another.) It runs 
as follows. Rational entitlement is entitlement to “take for granted”, to trust “implicitly”, as 
we say; it is to bracket any doubt. But if determining risk is to be calculation of probabilities, 
and cornerstones are to be included within the scope of the determination, then within a 
Bayesian framework we need to assign priors to cornerstone propositions. True, when Pr is a 
function of evidential probability, White’s reasoning assumed only that such propositions are 
not evidentially certain. But is it satisfactory to construe Pr(C) for these purposes purely as a 
function of evidential probability? It is suggestive that Wittgenstein’s last notes, from which 
Entitlement theory takes inspiration, are entitled On Certainty, and it was not evidential 
certainty that Wittgenstein had in mind! The second response to the revamped Leaching 
worry will contend that when S is rationally entitled to trust ¬SH, this trust should be 
unreserved: S’s entitlement is to regard ¬SH as assured and to treat it accordingly as beyond 
doubt. Consequently, we should set Pr(¬SH) as equal to	1 and Pr(SH) as equal to 0, thus 
cutting the ground from under the proof of (Quasi-leaching). Under that assignment, an 
acceptance of ¬SH should no longer be regarded as epistemically risky and there will 
accordingly be no significant epistemic risk that might be quasi-leached to P. When our 
entitlements are conceived as legitimate certainties, nothing prevents a subject from 
justifiably believing P on the basis of E, indeed from claiming knowledge on that basis, with 
a corresponding certainty. 
 This is liable to provoke the immediate rejoinder that to respond in this manner is 
simply to forget the way in which Pr needs to be interpreted in order to model epistemic risk 
in the first place. The kind of risk we are concerned with — the kind of risk that, after all, 
Wright’s original response to the leaching worry does implicitly concede that we do indeed 
run in accepting sceptically-challenged cornerstones—is essentially that of going beyond the 
evidence, and in order to be at the service of modelling this notion of epistemic risk, Pr 
accordingly needs to be a function purely of evidential probability. So, Pr can account only 
and specifically for S’s degrees of rational confidence based on the evidence available to her. 
The alleged fact that S is non-evidentially entitled to accept ¬SH with complete assurance 
cannot be allowed to imply anything about the value of Pr(¬SH) properly so interpreted, still 
less that it approximates 1.  
 The rejoinder is fair against the letter of Wright (2004) ad hominem. But a proponent 
of the second response should reply that, once entitlement is accepted as a form of genuinely 
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epistemic — though non-evidential — warrant, it is no longer satisfactory to interpret the 
notion of significant epistemic risk purely as evidential risk. Rather the epistemic risk one 
runs in accepting P should be computed as a function of one’s total epistemic situation, 
encompassing both one’s evidential and non-evidential warrants. It can still be acknowledged 
that one runs an evidential risk in accepting cornerstones. But there is now no normative 
punch associated with that acknowledgement. The acceptance of things which one is 
rationally warranted in treating as certain, if that is indeed the pay-off of entitlement, cannot 
coherently be conceived as the running of risks in any sense that implies epistemic 
culpability.  
 (iii) The foregoing is one way of implementing the more general idea that the 
cornerstones and other entitlements should somehow occupy a special status when it comes 
to the probabilistic computation of risk. But a sneaking sense may persist that to pursue the 
general idea in that way— to treat the cornerstones as certain and sure — is somehow to 
disrespect scepticism, to undervalue the intellectual achievement of the best sceptical 
paradoxes. Against that, it may be said that what is being mooted is an entitlement to treat the 
cornerstones as certain, not to feel that they are certain—the certainty that Hume, at least in 
the study, found it so difficult to feel. However, we will not pursue this issue here. A third 
way to respond to the revamped leaching worry avoids investing in the putative certainty of 
entitlements in either sense. It starts with acknowledging that there is indeed an open question 
about what exactly our epistemic entitlements are best conceived a licensing us to do — what 
attitude or action is rationalised thereby. We have so far been assuming, with Wright (2004 
and elsewhere) that entitlement should be conceived as something in the ballpark of a license 
to accept or trust in the hinge proposition “There is a material world”. But, on reflection, it is 
not obvious that this kind of interpretation is indeed even in the best ballpark. Advocates of 
entitlement theory can contend that in this and other cases of this type, one’s entitlement is 
best construed in a way inspired by David Lewis’ classic contextualist manifesto19 as 
entitlement to ignore ¬SH –– or more exactly, to ignore both SH and, consequently, ¬SH.  
 This idea should not, we suggest, seem terribly odd or unnatural. An entitlement of 
this type, to disregard both a sceptical hypothesis and the cornerstones that it attacks, would 
simply sanction what a normal subject would probably already do. In daily life and science, 
people ignore sceptical possibilities even when they are aware of them. An epistemologist, 
fresh from giving a talk on Descartes and attempting to remember on what level she earlier 
parked her car in the airport parking structure, may experience mounting anxiety but one 
thing she won’t be anxious about will be the possibility that her memory might have been 
tricked by a Cartesian demon, or indeed that she has no car nor any other material 
possessions for that matter, including her physical body. Similarly, the physicists who have 
recently detected gravitational waves have certainly ignored the conjecture that the Matrix 
might have fabricated their data, though some of them at least are very likely have watched 
the film “The Matrix”, or are anyway familiar with the story told in it. 
 Someone might suggest that in cases like these, although admittedly at some level 
aware of them, the subjects are able to ignore sceptical possibilities only because they don’t 
actually attend to the scenarios involved, which remain, like a prospectively uncomfortable 
dental appointment still some weeks away, at the periphery of their thoughts; and that if the 
imagined epistemologist or the physicists were actually to focus on the relevant sceptical 
hypotheses, then of course they could no longer possibly ignore them. If that were correct, 
the proposal that we have entitlements to ignore sceptical scenarios would be pointless, since 
we wouldn’t be able to cash the license such entitlements provided, once we confronted any 
 
19 Lewis (1996). 
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specific sceptical challenge. In order to be of any counter-sceptical use, our epistemic 
entitlements have to be things we can exploit precisely when we attend to sceptical 
conjectures. Rights ain't worth a lot if we cannot appeal to them in exactly the situations 
when they might benefit us. 
  An emblematic example of the idea at work in that train of thought is Lewis’s Rule of 
Attention, according to which “a possibility that is not ignored at all is ipso facto not properly 
ignored”20 Lewis thought –– or seems to have thought –– that this principle should strike one 
as self-evident. However, for the kind of ignoring that is here germane—ignoring not as 
ignorance but as a kind of active disregard — the Rule of Attention is not merely not self-
evident but manifestly tendentious. The relevant point is succinctly made by Michael 
Williams: 
If (rudely or quite understandably) I ignore you at a party, this is not because I don’t realise 
you are there. On the contrary, I have to know you are there to ignore you. So too in epistemic 
matters. I can (properly or improperly) ignore –– i.e. not take into account –– possibilities of 
which I am fully aware. 21  
Since we are in this sense psychologically capable of ignoring things we attend to, one may 
wonder –– pace Lewis –– in what cases we can properly ignore things that we attend to –– in 
particular, sceptical possibilities like SH. The answer being suggested is that we can properly 
ignore sceptical scenarios –– in the sense of legitimately refusing to take them into account in 
our epistemic evaluations –– when we are epistemically entitled to do so. 
 How does entitlement, so conceived as to license deliberate disregard, provide the 
resources to defuse the revamped Leaching worry? Very directly. White’s result and its 
corollary, (Quasi-Leaching), depend as noted on our taking SH and its kin to lie within the 
range of propositions over which Pr is defined. There is no reason, once we are entitled to 
ignore certain possibilities, why that range should be taken to include such possibilities — 
why SH should be included in the range of propositions over which a fully rational subject, S, 
distributes her degrees of confidence. Clearly, if S is entitled to ignore the possibility SH, S is 
entitled not to include SH (and thus ¬SH) in the relevant probabilistic algebra. And if SH 
isn’t included, “Pr(SH)” no longer has a denotation, and the first assumption of White’s 
proof, that 
  (1) Pr(SH) > 0 
is once again undercut.22 
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